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DEVELOPMENT AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: A




In Vienna in 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights recognized that
women's rights are human rights.' However, even today, the foundations of this
claim are not always made clear and it is seen as merely political. This, however,
is a simplistic position far from the truth. Sen has pointed out that the capabilities
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1. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme ofAction, 1118, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993); see also MICHELINE R. ISHAY,
THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE GLOBALIZATION ERA 106-112 (2004)
(referencing a fairly comprehensive history of human rights including women's rights and modern
pioneers such as Mary Astell (1666-1731), Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), and Olympe de Gouge
(1748-1793), who are important precursors of the belated recognition in Vienna).
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approach provides at least a partial foundation for human rights. 2  This paper
claims that extensions of the capabilities approach can further progress a
theoretical foundation of women's rights.
Here I attempt to examine specifically this line of thought in providing some
theoretical advances for development and women's rights as human rights, that are
highly policy-relevant, by relying on an explicitly dynamic social version of the
capabilities approach called "the social capabilities" approach. This version of the
social capabilities approach extends important aspects of Sen's characterization of
development as freedom.3 This approach also has the virtue of being grounded in
the ontology of difference that respects cultural differences and nuances within a
moral realist framework.4 An alternative set of economic and social policies with
an enabling legal-political environment for advancing women's rights and
development follow logically from the approach developed here.5 In this paper by
political economy, I mean the classical state and civil society-including their 2 0th
century extensions-and their interactions.6 By social economy, I mean the
underlying social basis of the political economy including the family structure and
2. Amartya Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, 6 J. OF HUMAN DEv. 151, 151-52 (2005)
[hereinafter Sen, Human Rights]; Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 315, 332-38 (2004) [hereinafter Sen, Elements].
3. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 17-18 (1999) [hereinafter SEN,
DEVELOPMENT] for a discussion on how the concept of personal "capabilities" interacts with
development and individual freedoms.
4. See LILA ABU-LUGHOD, DO MUSLIM WOMEN NEED SAVING? (2013); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013); GLENN
C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); Richard N. Boyd, How to Be a Moral
Realist, in ESSAYS ON MORAL REALISM 181 (Geoffrey Sayre-McCord ed., 1988); FLIx GUATTARI &
SUELY ROLNIK, MICROPOLITICA: CARTOGRAFIAS DO DESEJO (1986), translated in KAREL CLAPSHOW
& BRIAN HOLMES, MOLECULAR REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL (2008); GILLES DELEUZE & FELix GUATrARI,
MILLE PLATEAUX (1980), translated in BRIAN MASSUMI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS (1987); JACQUES
DERRIDA, POSITIONS (1972), translated in ALAN BASS, POSITIONS (1981); GILLES DELEUZE,
DIFFtRENCE ET REPETITION (1968), translated in PAUL PATTON, DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION (1994);
Cille Kennedy et al., Mental Health, Disabilities, and Women: A Policy Oriented Data Review, 8 J.
DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. 1, 1-2 (1997); U.N. Centre for Reg'l Dev., Transitional Economies and
Regional Economic Development Strategies: Lessons from Five Low-Income Developing Countries, 19
U.N. CENTRE FOR REG'L DEv. RESEARCH REPORT (Haider A. Khan & Asfaw Kumssa eds., Sept. 1996)
[hereinafter UNCRD].
5. The book by Lila Abu-Lughod in particular, based on her extensive fieldwork among the
Bedouins, illustrates powerfully why a dynamic view of difference accepted with humility is so
important for both the social scientist and the policymaker. See Abu-Lughod, supra note 4. This is also
important with respect to creating applicable democratic theory for Islamic societies. See id. Refer to
Nader Hashemi's book on the important issues regarding Islam, secularism, and democracy. NADER
HASHEMI, ISLAM, SECULARISM, AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC THEORY FOR
MUSLIM SOCIETIES (2009). An ontology of difference would suggest an endogenous generative power
regarding democracy in Islamic societies that can be creative in its own way that is different from what
happened elsewhere historically.
6. See HAIDER A. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY: LIMITS OF
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS IN THE AGE OF POSTMODERNISM, at ch. 7 (1998) [hereinafter KHAN,
TECHNOLOGY (1998)] for a discussion on "the classical idea of a polis for a modem polity."
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various overlapping communities in which the family and the individuals are
embedded.
I begin with the standard approach to human rights and discuss the Universal
Human Rights Model ("UHRM") before developing the nuanced social
capabilities approach followed throughout the rest of this paper. I present "deep
democracy" as a structure in addition to formal democratic apparatus such that the
practice of such democratic life can be reproduced with the basic values intact.8
Change is not precluded. However, all such changes should deepen democracy,
not weaken it.9 "Deep democracy" in this sense is intimately connected with
economic and social justice.' 0 As will be seen later in this paper, the social
capabilities approach, women's rights, and "deep democracy" are related in an
intimate way.
II. THE STANDARD CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights, as they are usually and loosely conceived, are the rights that
one has because one is human. Before accepting this simple definition, a series of
questions must be asked. For example, what does it mean to have a right? How
are being human and having rights related? Are there alternatives to the simple
and usually minimalist definitions of human rights as the rights that one has
because one is human? How do women's rights relate to human rights?
As Donnelly explains:
7. Here, we need to be mindful of Gayatri Spivak's insightful remarks on "women's rights as
human rights" as a slogan only in Kolkata and the ontology of difference combined with actual
involved fieldwork and participation in actual women's movements from below. Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, Sunil Gangopadhyay Memorial Session-Kolkata Literary Meet 2013, YouTUBE (Feb. 13,
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-bl96CksnjEl. Spivak's remarks on human rights discourse in
civil society as a sign of failure of both state and revolution point towards the need for deeper reflection,
especially on the politics of the human rights discourse. See id. Clearly, one major evasion of
mainstream human rights discourse is the suppression of class differences. The differential ontology,
based among other things on a radical political and social economy approach of differentiation, brings
to light what is buried deep in the political unconscious-to use the term by Jameson-by bourgeois
humanism and presents the struggle for human rights of women as a differential struggle on the road to
emancipation that cannot ignore the class differential among both men and women. Id.; see also
FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT (1981).
8. See generally KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; Haider A. Khan, Deepening
Democracy During Crisis: Building on an Ontology of Difference, COSMOPOLIS (2012) [hereinafter
Khan, Deepening Democracy]; Haider A. Khan, A Theory of Deep Democracy and Economic Justice in
the Age of Postmodernism, I CONTEMP. READINGS IN L. & SOC. JUST. 47-48 (2009) [hereinafter Khan,
Deep Democracy (2009)], available at
http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=3897d9e2-ca3a-4924-96dl -42f5d68a8ce8;
Haider A. Khan, A Theory of Deep Democracy and Economic Justice in the Age of Postmodernism,
CIRJE F-SERIES, NO. CIRJE-F-468, (2007) [hereinafter Khan, Deep Democracy (2007)], available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/tkyfseres/2007cf468.htm.
9. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at
14 (providing a list of conditions or changes that must be made for democracy to be deepened).
10. See generally KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009),
supra note 8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8.
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"Right" in English, like equivalent words in several other languages,
has two central moral and political senses: rectitude and entitlement. In
the sense of rectitude, we speak of "the right thing to do," of something
being right (or wrong). In the narrower sense of entitlement we
typically speak of someone having a right."
Rights claims imply both a right-holder and a duty-bearer. There is a strong
presumption that the duty-bearer must attend to the right-holder's entitlement.12
A Hohfeldian conception of rights defines a field of rule-governed
interactions centered on, and under the control of, the right-holder." Thus,
Donnelly tells us:
"A has a right to x (with respect to B)" specifies a right-holder
(A), an object of the right (x), and a duty-bearer (B). It also outlines the
relationships in which they stand. A is entitled to x (with respect to B),
B stands under correlative obligations to A (with respect to x), and,
should it be necessary, A may make special claims upon B to discharge
those obligations.
Rights are not reducible to the correlative duties of those against
whom they are held. If Anne has a right to x with respect to Bob, it is
more than simply desirable, good, or even right that Anne enjoy x. She
is entitled to it. Should Bob fail to discharge his obligations, besides
acting improperly (i.e., violating standards of rectitude) and harming
Anne, he violates her rights, making him subject to special remedial
claims and sanctions.
Neither is having a right reducible to enjoying a benefit. Anne is
not a passive beneficiary of Bob's obligation. She is actively in charge
of the relationship, as suggested by the language of "exercising" rights.
She may assert her right to x. If he fails to discharge his obligation,
Anne may press further claims against Bob, choose not to pursue the
matter, or even excuse him, largely at her own discretion. Rights
empower, not just benefit, those who hold them.14
The social capabilities approach to women's rights that I develop here
emphasizes the positive freedom to achieve crucial aspects of socially grounded
individuality of the right bearer and, in this sense, provides a social foundation for
women's rights. However, first I must discuss the UHRM, which can also be
justified from the social capabilities point of view.
11. JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (3d ed. 2013); see
also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 188 (1977) explaining, "the word 'right' has
different force in different contexts."
12. DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 7-8.
13. See id. at 7-12; see also Rights, The Form of Rights: The Hohfeldian Analytical System, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (July 2, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.1.
14. DONNELLY, supra note 11, at 8.
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III. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS MODEL
In recognition of the central role of the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights"' 5 in establishing the contemporary consensus on internationally recognized
human rights, one can justify calling it the Universal Human Rights Model.
However, it is not thereby implied that the model is complete. In fact, extensions
to women's rights are an example of a good use of the universalizing tendencies in
the UHRM. As is well known, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, by a vote of 48-0
(with eight abstentions). 16 Since then virtually all states have endorsed it regularly
and repeatedly." This phenomenon accounts for the wide acceptance of the idea
that for the purposes of international action, "human rights" means roughly, what
is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'8
The purpose of presenting the list below from UHRM is to examine the
implications for women's rights in the UHRM. This paper examines these
implications not just for the sake of understanding the connection between UHRM
and women's status, though this is one of the goals of this paper, but for the goal of
learning something about the specific policies of the state apparatus in light of its
human rights obligations and commitments. As mentioned earlier, this paper bases
its approach to human rights on the social capabilities theory, which follows
immediately after this section. Therefore, interpret the UHRM presented below in
that light.
This list from the UHRM includes all rights that receive explicit mention in
both the Universal Declaration and its Covenants or receives a full article in one of
these three instruments: the Universal Declaration (U), the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (C), or the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (E). References are to the article by number in the
respective instrument.' 9
* Nondiscrimination (U2, E2, C2)
* Life (U3, C6)
* Liberty and security of person (U3, C9)
* Protection against slavery (U4, C8)
* Legal personality (U6, C16)
* Equal protection of the law (U7, C14, C26)
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(lll)
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
16. Irving Samoff, U.N. Declaration, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2001),
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/14/local/me-63234; see generally UDHR, supra note 15; ISHAY,
supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing the origins of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
17. See generally ISHAY, supra note 1, at tbls.A.3 & A.4 for a demonstration of the continuance of
various countries convening to create human rights-related documents.
18. See id. at 18.
19. UDHR, supra note 15; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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* Legal remedy (U8, C2)
* Protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (U9, C9)
* Access to independent and impartial tribunal (U 10, C14)
* Presumption of innocence (Ul 1, C14)
* Protection against ex post facto laws (Ul 1, C15)
* Privacy (U12, C17)
* Freedom of movement (U 13, C12)
* Nationality (U 15, C24)
* Marry and found a family (U 16, C23)
* Protection and assistance of families (U 16, E10, C23)
* Marriage only with free consent of spouses (U 16, E10, C23)
* Equal rights of men and women in marriage (U 16, C23)
* Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (U 18, C18)
* Freedom of opinion and expression (U19, C19)
* Freedom of assembly (U20, C21)
* Freedom of association (U20, C22)
* Participation in government (U2 1, C25)
* Social security (U22, E9)
* Work (U23, E6)
* Just and favorable conditions of work (U23, E7)
* Trade Unions (U23, E8, C22)
* Rest and leisure (U24, E7)
* Adequate standard of living (U25, El1)
* Education (U26, E13)
* Participation in cultural life (U27, E15)
* Self-determination (El, Cl)
* Protection of and assistance to children (E10, C24)
* Freedom from hunger (El1)
* Health (E12, U25)
* Asylum (U 14)
* Property (U17)
* Compulsory primary education (E14)
* Humane treatment when deprived of liberty (C 10)
* Protection against imprisonment for a debt (Cl1)
* Expulsion of aliens only by law (C 13)
* Prohibition of war propaganda and incitement to discrimination
(C20)
* Minority culture (C27)
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IV. THE SOCIAL CAPABILITIES APPROACH TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Various theorists drawing upon the insights of Adam Smith have proposed a
theoretically rigorous and elaborate evaluation of well-being. 20  Sen is the
originator of this "capability approach" in recent times.2 1 The theoretical
criticisms of the utilitarian approach by Sen, Nussbaum and others that this
approach reduces all qualities into quanta of utilities are serious ones. 22 Nussbaum
gives a graphic example of this by quoting the exchange between Mr. Gradgrind,
economist and grief-stricken father, and his pupil Bitzer.23 Bitzer outdoes his
mentor by adhering to a strict code of utilitarian rationality that cannot comprehend
a father's grief.24 Khan has pursued a similar line of criticism in a number of
recent papers and in the book Technology, Development and Democracy.25 This
approach makes the capabilities explicitly social and asks what concatenation of
economic (real and financial) and other (e.g., political, social etc.) institutions will
allow capabilities to be both increase steadily on the average and tend to equalize
them among diverse individuals? 26 In effect, as the following discussion makes
clear, we are asking how can we increase and equalize real, positive freedom for
individuals in specific social contexts?
In discussing the well-being implications of human rights for women in
particular, I wish to take on a version of the social capabilities approach. It is not
my intent to present how human rights policies for women affect detailed empirical
indicators of well-being. I simply wish to pose clearly the conceptual problem of
evaluating the problems of denying women their rights and the possible
consequences of human rights based reforms. The institutional reforms and
changes proposed later in this paper, and by feminist scholars who suggest
20. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
IV (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS Part I (Dover Publications, Inc. 2006) (1759).
21. Sen, Elements, supra note 2, at 332-38. See also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED,
at xi (2012); SEN, DEVELOPMENT supra note 3, at 18; Sen, Human Rights, supra note 2, at 152.
22. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 11-15 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN].
23. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 1, 13,
22, 23 (1995).
24. Id. at 23 (describing Bitzer as a "good student" because of his "remarkably flat and abstract
description" of a horse that was devoid of emotion).
25. See KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6; UNCRD, supra note 8; Haider A. Khan &
Hitoshi Sogabe, Macroeconomic Effects of IMF Adjustment Policies, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN AFRICA:
ADJUSTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at ch. 11 (George W. Shepherd & Karamo N.M.
Sonko eds., 1994); Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 1; Haider A. Khan & Mariko
Frame, China's Energy Security: National Security, Ecological Balance and Regional Co-operation,
CIRJE-F-482 (2007), available at http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2007/2007cf482.pdf;
Haider Khan, Technology, Modernity, and Development: Creating Social Capabilities in a POLIS, in
MODERNITY AND TECHNOLOGY 327 (Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey, & Andrew Feenberg eds., 2003).
26. See generally KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOLUME I, at chs. 1-10 (1867) for a discussion on
commodities, exchange, money, the circulation of commodities, the general formula for capital, the
buying and selling of labor-power, the labor process, the producing surplus value process, constant and
variable capital, the surplus-value rate, and the working day.
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alternative non-patriarchal structures, must be proven to be capability-enhancing
for women, or at least not to be capability-reducing for them. First, we still need to
ask what social capabilities means both abstractly and concretely.
In a number of influential and insightful contributions, Martha Nussbaum has
developed an Aristotelian interpretation of capabilities.27 The connections between
capabilities and a distinctly Aristotelian conception of human flourishing are
indeed striking. Later in this section, we will discuss a list of general capabilities
drawing upon both Sen and Nussbaum. The Aristotelian connections will become
quite clear through this exercise in comparison and contrast.
In my article Technology, Development and Democracy, I point out some
Hegelian connections as well.28 In particular, the Hegelian conception of freedom
as an interactive arrangement in society where concrete institutions of family, civil
society, and state all play definite roles seems a specifically modem way of
viewing the possibilities and limits of human flourishing in a liberal society based
on private property.29 Hegel's Philosophy of Right is a landmark contribution, in
this sense, to the elucidation of the problem of freedom in modem societies.30
The equally interesting thesis of Gilbert that Marx was an Aristotlean in his
critique of alienation illustrates that such a conception of the theory of alienation
supports the emphasis on the capabilities as a non-alienated set of qualities that are
potentially attainable, but may actually be largely unachievable- particularly for
women-under the existing institutional arrangements. 3 ' Gilbert points out that in
some parts of Marx's Capital "compared productive activity in general with labor
under capitalism in a precisely Aristotelian way."32 Marx's characterization of
Milton's labors on the Paradise Lost as self-motivated, non-alienated labor and his
contrast of such labor with that of a hack writer who writes only for the money he
receives from the capitalist publisher underlines the good of genuine life-affirming
labor.3 3 Ironically, in real life under capitalism and in bourgeois political economy
Milton's labor is "unproductive"34 while the hack is a "productive" wage-laborer.
In Capital, Marx shows how the accumulated dead labor in the form of capital
dominates workers. Workers are mere means of further accumulation. Under
the sign of capital, death dominates over life and denies the workers the necessary
opportunity to realize their potential to be free, creative beings.3 8 In particular,
27. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN supra note 22, at I1.
28. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 7-8.
29. G.W.F. HEGEL, GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (1821), translated in S.W.
DYDE, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT xlviii-xlix (Dover Publications, Inc. 2005) (1896).
30. Id.
31. ALAN GILBERT, DEMOCRATIC INDIVIDUALITY 41,239-40 (1990).
32. Id. at 265.
33. Id. at 250, 265.
34. That is, under the strict assumption that no wage payments were made.
35. GILBERT, supra note 31, at 265.
36. MARX, supra note 26, at 281.
37. Id. at 247-48, 289-91.
38. Id. at 246-48.
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Marx argues that going beyond abstract labor means recognizing the use
value/exchange value distinction as emerging in a historically specific, alienated
and alienating, mode of production. 39 Going beyond such a distinction ultimately
means going beyond the value form itself in the political economic sphere, or
rather more broadly, a transvaluation of values 40 in a society of the future that can
result from a transformation of capitalist social relations historically. 41 As Gilbert
points out, Marx's seemingly non-moral starting point of analyzing commodities
ultimately leads to a moral critique of capital as a social relation.42 Interestingly, a
qualitative labor theory of value ("QLTV") that is currently being developed by a
Hegelian group of thinkers would seem to imply such a moral critique as well.43
Taking the QLTV as the central explanatory framework and connecting it
with eudemonism can help illuminate Foucault's important insights about the
societies of discipline and control that form a part of his critique of modernity.
From this point of view, such developments are consistent with the reproduction of
the value form under the domination of capital. Foucault shows how the discipline
of the army served as the model for discipline in the factory. 44  In fact, for
Foucault, this disciplinary mode of functioning will permeate virtually every
institution with a more subtle and manipulative until a system of control can be
developed.45
Foucault's concept of bio-power46 is a particularly powerful way of
characterizing how the production and reproduction of life itself can become an
object of control under capitalism. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault analyzes in
detail how the human body can be objectified.47 The fundamental goal of the
disciplinary power was to create a "docile body". 48 At the same time, this docile
body also needed to be a productive body.49 Looked at from the perspective of
QLTV, this implies nothing less than the total alienation of flesh and spirit.5 0 Once
again, the problem from the human point of view-in spite of the ironically
39. See MARX, supra note 26, chs. 1-10.
40. The Nietzschean language is intentional. A radical interpretation of both Marx and Nietzsche
can find important similarities in exploring the nature of freedom.
41. See MARX, supra note 26, chs. 1-10.
42. GILBERT, supra note 31, at 268-69.
43. See, e.g., PETER C. DOOLEY, THE LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE 16 (2005).
44. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 142 (2d
ed. 1977).
45. Id.
46. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); Michel
Foucault, The Politics ofHealth in the Eighteenth Century, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed.,
1980); Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique in DITS ET ECRITS (1994). Foucault's debt to
Nietzsche as far as the exploration of biopower among other things, through a genealogical study is
concerned, has been acknowledged by Foucault himself.
47. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON (1975) translated in
ALAN SHERIDAN, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH : THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (2d ed. 1995).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. ch. 1.
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avowed "anti-humanism" of early Foucault 51-then becomes how to overcome this
alienation?
We now turn to this problem: If, as I have argued so far, the abolition of
alienation requires the abolition of capital as a relation of domination, can QLTV
throw any light on how to abolish capital as a social relation? Could capabilities
then be reconstrued in a more radically critical way by following this Aristotelian-
Hegelian-Marxian connection? In the rest of this paper, I show that this can be
done and explore the further implications of this move for development theory and
policy. In what follows, I first give a characterization of capabilities following
Sen, Nussbaum and others. Then I discuss the fully social and political nature of
these capabilities. One can construe capabilities as general powers of human body
and mind under specified social, economic, and political structures that can be
acquired, maintained, nurtured, and developed.52 Capabilities can be diminished
and even completely lost under circumstances such as malnutrition or severe
confinement.53  I have emphasized elsewhere the irreducibly social (not merely
biological) character of these human capabilities. Sen himself emphasizes "a
certain sort of possibility or opportunity for functioning" without always carefully
specifying the institutional setting.
In order to assess the critical reach of such a fully social capabilities
perspective we need to go further and try to describe more concretely what some of
the basic capabilities may be. David Crocker has given an admirable summary of
both Nussbaum's and Sen's approach to capabilities in a recent essay. 54 Mainly
relying on Nussbaum but also on other sources (shown below), he has compiled a
list that is worth reproducing here:
Basic Human "Social"55 Capabilities
(N and S stand for "Nussbaum" and "Sen," respectively; the quoted items
come from Nussbaum unless otherwise noted)
1. Virtues in Relation to Mortality
1.1. N and S: "Being able to live to the end of a complete
human life, so far as is possible
1.2. N: Being able to be courageous
2. Bodily Virtues
51. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 88-89.
52. Id. at 95.
53. Id.; see David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and
Nussbaum's Development Ethic, Part 2, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF
HUMAN CAPABILITIES 153, 157-60 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Johnathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Crocker, Functioning and Capability]; David A. Crocker, Toward Development Ethics, 19 WORLD
DEV. 457, 465-66 (1991) [hereinafter Crocker, Development Ethics].
54. See Crocker, Functioning and Capability, supra note 53, at 157-64.
55. Our usage of social is akin to Gilbert's use of "social" in social theory. Important political
features are also included in the category of "social." GILBERT, supra note 31, at 16-18. However, as
above, I will use "social and political" also to underline the salience of both political ideas and
practices.
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2.1. N and S: "Being able to have good health"
2.2. N and S: "Being able to be adequately nourished"
2.3. N and S: "Being able to have adequate shelter"
2.4. N: "Being able to have opportunities for sexual
satisfaction"
2.5. N and S: "Being able to move about from place to place"
3. Virtue of Pleasure
3.1. N and S: Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful
pain and to have pleasurable experiences
4. Cognitive Virtues
4.1. N: "Being able to use the five senses"
4.2. N: "Being able to imagine"
4.3. N: "Being able to think and reason"
4.4. N and S: Being "acceptably well-informed"
5. Virtues of Affiliation I (Compassion)
5.1. N: "Being able to have attachments to things and persons
outside ourselves"
5.2. N: "Being able to love, grieve, to feel longing and
gratitude"
6. Virtue of Practical Reason (Agency)
6.1. N: "Being able to form a conception of the good"
S: "Capability to choose," "ability to form goals,
commitments, values"
6.2. N and S:" Being able to engage in critical reflection about
the planning of one's own life"
7. Affiliation II (Friendship and Justice)
7.1. N: "Being able to live for and to others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various
forms of familial and social interaction"
7.1.1. N: Being capable of friendship
S: Being able to visit and entertain friends
7.1.2. S: Being able to participate in the community
7.1.3. N: Being able to participate politically and being
capable ofjustice
8. Ecological Virtue
8.1. N: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to
animals, plants and the world of nature"
9. Leisure Virtues
9.1. N: "Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational
activities"
10. Virtues of Separateness
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10.1. N: "Being able to live one's own life and nobody else's"'
10.2. N: "Being able to live in one's very own surroundings and
context"
I1. Virtue of Self-respect
11.1. S: "Capability to have self-respect"
11.2. S: "Capability of appearing in public without shame"
12. Virtue of Human Flourishing
12.1. N: "Capability to live a rich and fully human life, up to
the limit permitted by natural possibilities"
12.2. S: "Ability to achieve valuable functionings" 56
As Crocker correctly points out, we can facilitate this ordering by requiring
that "it might be better for practical rationality and affiliation to 'infuse' but not
'organize' the other virtues."57  Crocker contrasts Nussbaum's approach with
Sen's: 5
Sen's and Nussbaum's lists differ at a few points. For Sen, the bodily
capabilities and functionings are intrinsically good and not, as they are
in some dualistic theories of the good life, merely instrumental means to
other (higher) goods. In interpreting Aristotle, Nussbaum distinguishes
between bodily functionings that are chosen and intentional, for
instance, "chosen self-nutritive and reproductive activities that form
part of a reason-guided life" and those that are non-intentional, such as
digestion and other "functioning of the bodily system in sleep."59
Furthermore, Nussbaum has included items such as "being able to have
attachments to things and persons outside ourselves" and "being able to live with
concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature,"60 for which
Sen has no counterparts. These items are welcome features. Item 8, "ecological
virtue," is an especially important addition to Nussbaum's outlook.6' Crocker
points out that:
In a period when many are exploring ways of effecting a convergence
between environmental ethics and development ethics, it is important
that an essentially anthropocentric ethic "make room" for respect for
other species and for ecological systems. Worth considering is whether
Nussbaum's "ecological virtue" is strong enough. Perhaps it should be
formulated to read: "Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and nature as intrinsically valuable." Item 9 injects
56. WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES (Martha C.
Nussbaum & Johnathan Glover eds., 1995); Crocker, Functioning and Capability, supra note 53, at
174-76 (footnotes and citations omitted).
57. Crocker, Functioning and Capability, supra note 53, at 176.
58. Id. at 176-77.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 155, 175.
61. Id. at 175.
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some appealing playfulness in a list otherwise marked by the "spirit of
seriousness." What explains the presence of these items on Nussbaum's
list, their absence on Sen's list, and, more generally, the more concrete
texture often displayed in Nussbaum's descriptions? One hypothesis is
that the differences are due to Nussbaum's greater attention . . . to the
limits, vulnerabilities, and needs of human existence. Further, it may be
that Nussbaum's richer conception of human beings derives from
making use "of the story-telling imagination far more than the scientific
intellect." On the other hand, Sen helpfully includes the good of self-
respect, a virtue that enables him to find common ground with Rawls
and to establish links with the Kantian ethical tradition, in which moral
agents have the obligation to respect all persons, including themselves,
as ends-in-themselves.62
Both Sen and Nussbaum agree, however, that these capabilities are distinct
and of central importance. 63  One cannot easily trade off one dimension of
capability against another. At most, one can do so in a very limited way. One
cannot reduce capabilities to a common measure such as utility. As Crocker points
out, "capability ethic" has implications for freedom, rights, and justice going far
beyond simple distribution of income considerations.6 If one accepts the
capability approach as a serious foundation for human development, then it follows
that going beyond distributive justice is necessary for a complete evaluation of the
impact of economic policies.
In evaluating any policy regime-for instance international financial regimes
and national economic policies under globalization-from this perspective not
only do I wish to pose the question of efficiency, but also the whole set of
questions regarding human freedom, in particular, the positive human freedom to
be or to do certain things. Thus, creation of markets and efficient production by
itself would mean very little if it led to a lopsided distribution of benefits. Worse
yet, if markets and other institutions led to phenomena such as reduced life
expectancy, increased unemployment, reduced consumption levels for many, and
deprivation for certain groups such as women and minorities then they will not
even be weakly equitable global economic structure. On the contrary, under such
circumstances, the global markets and other financial institutions will be strongly
inequitable from the capability perspective.
It is because of this perspective that the existing positive analysis of the
problems of political economy such as those of global financial markets and
institutions from the perspective of Social Capabilities Approach to Women's
Rights need to be put in a completely transparent "social capabilities" framework.
Such a framework is openly normative and makes a strong ethical case for helping
the disadvantaged increase their capabilities towards achieving equality of
capabilities. Thus, for instance, poorer nations and poor people in the global
62. Id. at 177.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 153.
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economy deserve a special ethical attention within any proposed global financial
architecture. As I showed in my keynote paper delivered at conference on
Financial Crisis, in Bali, Indonesia, in the context of adopting innovation structures
leading to increased productivities, ultimately the aim of any increase in
productivity needs to be the increase of freedom. 66 Such freedom, as Sen points
out has both an instrumental value and an ultimate value.67  Instrumentally,
freedom as social capabilities can lead to a further increase in productivity.68 Thus,
even a hard-nosed, efficiency driven analysis must address this aspect as an
empirical issue. Therefore, an Aristotelian interpretation of Sen-Nussbaum
conceptualization of capabilities can go a long way towards a social democratic
regime of development as freedom, and this is much to be applauded.
However, pushing the concept of social capabilities in the Hegel-Marx
direction of overcoming alienation by achieving freedom as a concrete universal
right requires a very radical form of global social democracy. An added strength
of such an approach will be to go some distance towards bridging the gap between
the process aspect of human and women's rights and the capabilities approach. I
now turn to a demonstration of this thesis.
V. FROM UTILITARIAN WELFARE ECONOMICS TO A SOCIAL CAPABILITIES BASED
ETHICS FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS
The utilitarian tradition in economics, as Sen correctly reminds us, is based on
three distinct components. 69 One of these components is consequentialism: 70 all
choices of actions, rules, institutions etc. must be judged by the consequences of
the particular choice made. In this sense, consequentialism is merely results
oriented. However, it does rule out purely or exclusively rights-based or
deontological decision rules. A second constituting element of utilitarianism is
what Sen has termed "welfarism."7' According to Sen welfarism "restricts the
judgments of state of affairs to the utilities in the respective states. . . ."72
Combining welfarism with consequentialism, one can derive the proposition that
"every choice must be judged by the respective utilities it generates." 73
Finally, the third element of utilitarianism, namely, sum-ranking of utilities,
imposes an aggregation scheme whereby utilities of different people can simply be
summed together without bothering about their distribution over the entire
65. Haider A. Khan, Global Financial Governance: Towards a New Global Financial Architecture
for Averting Deep Financial Crisis 32, Keynote paper delivered at conference on Financial Crisis, in
Bali, Indonesia (Sept. 24-26, 2013), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/49275/l/MPRApaper 49275.pdf [hereinafter Khan, Global Financial Governance].
66. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 97.
67. SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 157-58.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id.
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population. 74 This neatly sidesteps who gets what; but it is clearly the greatest
good under the three conditions when utility is the only good to consider. Notice
that Robbins attacked the classical utilitarian idea of interpersonal comparability
and, by implication, the sum-ranking of utilities in the 1930s. 75 However, the
alternative, radically subjective view of personal utility also sidesteps the issue of
distribution. No two Pareto optimal states are, strictly speaking, comparable. In
general, equilibrium theory, the second theorem of welfare economics, merely
states that under a suitable redistribution of initial endowments, one can achieve
every Pareto optimal state as a competitive equilibrium. However, there is no bias
towards-or, for that matter, against-an egalitarian distribution.
Sen's radical critique of utilitarianism and his replacement of utility with
capabilities have changed the paradigmatic terms of discourse. 76 It is no longer
necessary to debate the various meanings of utility and how best to distribute the
utilities. Positive, concrete freedoms, such as the Sen-Nussbaum list of capabilities
above demonstrates, have replaced the talk about utilities."
A new set of questions arise with this radical shift of the terrain of discourse.
What are the social, political, and economic conditions under which capabilities
are best promoted for all the people in an equalizing direction? Both the levels and
distribution of capabilities are important. Perhaps responding in an indirect way to
earlier criticisms, Sen has outlined the "perspective of freedom" more definitely.78
Freedom is important both for evaluative and for effectiveness reasons.
Evaluation of societies by the actual amount of substantive freedoms enjoyed by
people is radically different from using utility, procedural liberty, real income
etc.8 o Effectiveness reason rests on Sen's claim that freedom enhances the
"agency" of the individual leading to greater individual initiative and social
effective social participation. 8 ' Thus, freedom can be viewed as both the primary
end and the principal means for development. Sen also gives a five-fold
classification of instrumental freedoms as consisting of political freedoms,
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective
security.82
In the rest of this section, I argue that a perspective of global "deep
democracy" consistent with Sen's characterization of freedom83 leads us to a
consistent critique of the existing political and socioeconomic arrangements
74. Id.
75. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE, at
vii, 136-139 (3d ed. 1932).
76. See generally SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3.
77. Id.
78. Compare SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 62-63, with Crocker, Functioning and
Capability, supra note 53, at 174-76.
79. SEN, DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 18.
80. Id. at 19.
8 1. Id. at 18.
82. Id. at xii.
83. Id. at 3-4 (alleging that freedoms are not limited to narrow views of development, but also
include social and economic arrangements and political and civil rights).
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globally and furthermore it can be a pointed critique of the unjust treatment of
women in developing world in particular at present. Following the enlightenment
project as formulated by Kant,84 and the critique of Kantian understanding by
Hegel,8 5 and finally, the "this-sided" worldly critique of Hegel by Feuerbach 86 and
the dialectical critique of Feuerbach's one-sided materialism by Marx87 takes us to
a questioning of the existing institutions when these fail to promote and equalize
social capabilities. My piece Deepening Democracy During Crisis: Building on an
Ontology of Difference captures many of these concerns.
Building on the contributions of classical thinkers from Rousseau to modern
theories of participatory and strong democracy advanced by scholars such as
Barber," "deep democracy" advances the thesis of equalization of capabilities as a
central concern of global economic justice. Most important from this perspective
is the work by scholars such as Alan Gilbert on radical democracy that is
internationalist and welcomes mass activism.90
Extending the important earlier work of Gilbert, in a number of my essays and
books I establish the claim of equalizing social capabilities along with global
justice as central elements of a sufficiently rich conception of democracy that
respects the rights of citizens underlying the core concept of democracy. 9'
Conceiving rights following Sen as "goal rights" is one way to defend the
centrality of capabilities. Another way is to view these rights-most importantly,
the right to self-determination-as self-sustaining is if and only if movement
towards a global sustainability of equalization of capabilities occurs. Extending
Gilbert's cluster conditions for democracy, 92 I establish that three clusters are of
particular significance: political, economic, and cultural.93
The political cluster begins with formal democratic principles of universal
suffrage and elections, but does not stop there. Although this "formal democracy"
must be defended vigorously, it is seen as one aspect of a deeper form of
democracy that various polities are moving towards. In order to gain insight into
this deeper form, we need to ask what conditions can sustain freedom-
84. IMMANUEL KANT, AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT is ENLIGHTENMENT?" 1-3 (1784),
available at https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/What isEnlightenment.pdf.
85. GEORG HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 213-14 (T. M. Knox trans., 1969).
86. FREDERICK ENGELS, LUDWIG FEUERBACH UND DER AUSGANG DER KLASSISCHEN DEUTSCIIEN
PHILOSOPHIE (1886), translated in LUDWIG FEUERBACH AND THE END OF CLASSICAL GERMAN
PHILOSOPHY (Progress Publishers 1946), available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1 886/ludwig-feuerbach/.
87. KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, in EARLY WRITINGS (T. B.
Bottomore trans., 1964).
88. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 123; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009), supra note
8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 1-2; Khan, Deepening Democracy, supra note 8.
89. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117 (1984).
90. GILBERT, supra note 31.
91. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 8, at 95-99.
92. GILBERT, supra note 31; see also George Kateb, Democratic Individuality and Claims of
Politics, 12 POLITICAL THEORY 331 (1984).
93. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 8, at 92.
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particularly for women in developing countries-which underlies the core idea of
democracy. The answer is that as soon as freedom is conceived positively, and not
just as mere absence of coercions, capabilities come to the fore.
However, probing deeply into the project of enhancing and equalizing the
capabilities of citizens even in rough, practical sense, economic and cultural
conditions come to be seen as crucial. For example, education, including critical
ethical and political education, is recognized as of utmost importance. In so far as
democratic movements for a just society-women's rights movements being an
important part of these movements-have been schools for political education.
Schools of political education starting with at least the political movements from
17th century onwards including major movements in the 20th century and the new
social movements of this century are not just disruptive moments, but are complex
struggles where much political learning about freedom takes place. Thus, "deep
democracy" will necessarily involve a continuous engagement with the past,
present, and future of the democratic movements in a pluralistic context. Periodic
individual and mass, nonviolent civil disobedience movements will be a necessary
part of a "deep democratic" agenda.
Economically, the provision of leisure time for both personal private interest
and the exercise of citizenship responsibilities will be necessary. Workplace
democracy is also a salient condition, since production is socially necessary and
will occupy a certain amount of time for all able bodied and mentally competent
adults. The capabilities literature has not always been clear on this point. 94
However, it is logical to think that a person's capabilities will suffer deprivation if
working conditions do not allow discussion, participation, and "ownership" of
work conditions. The literature on flat organizations in knowledge economy
generally makes a case that organizations should treat the newer, "intellectual"
labor in this way.9 5 Alternatively, the social capabilities approach leads to the
conclusion that organizations large and small should treat all workers this way so
that organizations can overcome workplace alienation without necessarily using
labor saving capital-intensive technologies.
Overcoming alienation also requires a vibrant non-patriarchal culture where
artistic and other forms of individual and collective expressive activities are as
open as possible. Capabilities in this dimension are vital for the protection of
democratic values and practices, since these also involve internalization of mutual
respect, integrity, tolerance, and creativity. One can see that using the advances in
cognitive, social psychology and some schools of psychoanalysis capabilities can
be further advanced through a therapeutic approach to social problems. A
"postmodern" insight is also the need to recognize the limits to certain types of
94. See, e.g., KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 95-99; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009),
supra note 8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 4-5; Crocker, Functioning and
Capability, supra note 53; Khan, Global Financial Governance, supra note 73.
95. See, e.g., KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6 at 95-99; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009),
supra note 8; Khan, Deep Democracy (2007), supra note 8; Crocker, Functioning and Capability, supra
note 53; Khan, Global Financial Governance, supra note 73.
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economic growth. As Daly and others have pointed out, the scale of production
counts in a globalized, interdependent planet in a significant way.9 6 Ecological
issues will often require a just, global democratic procedure for deliberation and
policymaking. In short, all of the cluster conditions-political, economic, and
cultural-require a theory of global justice as an underpinning and justification.
I have proposed such a theory in the context of a postmodern world by
building on elements of Rawls and Sen, using the ontology of difference to take it
beyond a simple Eurocentric framework.97 In brief, the structural forces in the
global economy push towards integrating markets and regions. However, many
markets are embedded in national economies; there are also non-market aspects of
social and cultural lives of people that are threatened.98 As a result, we find the
contradictory phenomena of McWorld and Jihad. 99 The creation of a genuine
global society, which many see as the ultimate outcome of globalization, then
necessitates meeting the requirements of global justice. I mention at least five
areas, where the norms of global justice must evolve (among others): 00
1. International trade and monetary regimes: The current asymmetric
system of payments that penalizes the deficit countries by forcing only
them to bear the costs of adjustment needs to evolve into a global burden
sharing institution. The World Trade Organization similarly needs to
acknowledge the historical imbalances in the world trading system. For
example, specialization according to static comparative advantage may
lock the developing countries in a relatively backward situation in the
emerging global division of labor. 1
2. International capital flows: From the perspective of many people in the
developed economies, capital flight to least developed countries ("LDCs")
(with or without free trade agreements) may constitute a barrier to well-
being, at least in the short-run.102  At the same time foreign direct
investment in LDCs may create only low-wage, marginal jobs.'o3 A just
approach to foreign direct investment must consider the effects on both
the north and south in terms of self-determination. A controlled capital
flow accompanied by improvements of wages and working conditions in
the south may be the most desirable solution.104
3. International ecological considerations: Global interdependence has been
increasingly recognized in this area. However, it is not clear what justice
96. See HERMAN E. DALY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
SELECTED ESSAYS OF HERMAN DALY (2007).
97. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6, at 124-25.
98. Id.
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Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 131.
Adrian Wood, How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers, 9 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 57,61 (1995).
KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6.
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demands in terms of the relationship between the north and south. All
other things being equal, the enforcement of strict environmental
standards would seem to be just. However, some argue that such
standards may destroy the livelihood of some people in the south. A
global tax and transfer scheme would seem to be the precondition for
applying a global set of environmental standards. The transfer of
ecologically sound technology systems from rich to the poor countries is a
precondition for justice in this sphere. 0 5
4. Asset redistribution and human development: Much of the foregoing
discussion pinpoints the need for giving people the economic wherewithal
in order for them to develop their social capabilities. Most studies have
discovered that non-redistribution of assets to the poor hampers poverty
alleviation strategies. 0 6 Redistributing assets and developing their human
capital so that the poor can have access to markets becomes a major
necessity in our normative framework. In most parts of the world, this
will require structural reforms rather than marginal policy interventions.
5. Gender justice: The impact of globalization on women will have to be
assessed carefully. The well-documented facts regarding gender
inequalities, that so far have affected women's capabilities negatively,
demand unequivocally that policymakers pay careful attention to
enhancing (or at least not decreasing) women's capabilities. 107 Will
globalization help women to overcome social limitations such as lack of
nutrition and limits on participation in social, economic, and political life?
Unfortunately, the answer is unclear. As far as many developing country
women do not possess skills for the global market place, globalization is
already hurting them.
These five examples are illustrative and by no means do they exhaust all the
pertinent issues in moving towards a just economy globally. (For example, we
could add or highlight the growing rural/urban disparities with globalization and its
implications for justice). Nevertheless, they do illustrate both the problems and
prospects for justice in the age of globalization. One of the major political
problems we have not discussed so far is the weakening of national sovereignty
that the call for global economic justice entails. Agreeing to a global mode of
production and distribution constrained by the principles of justice does mean
surrendering considerable authority to international agreements, conventions, and
ultimately, perhaps to new international organizations. It should be observed,
however, that even without the constraining role of justice, the globalization
process weakens national sovereignty, even for advanced industrialized countries
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., IRMA ADELMAN & SHERMAN ROBINsON, INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF KOREA (1978); Jeffrey James & Haider A. Khan, The
Employment Effects of an Income Redistribution in Developing Countries, 21 WORLD DEV. 817 (1993).
107. See Human Development Reports (2000-2012), U.N. DEV. PROGRAM.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/global-reports (last visited July 20, 2014).
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(e.g., NAFTA). Thus, the call for a just economy must confront this (as well as
other issues, such as weakening of traditional cultural modes of living) head on in
the light of reasonable principles. The fundamental message is that among these
principles, freedom as rational autonomy of the individual must be the principal
one. This is one rational approach (perhaps the only one) if we are to avoid both
the Scylla of Jihad and the Charybdis of McWorld.
The McWorld aspect of globalization is a result of a fractured but real
economic, financial and technological integration. 08 Following the collapse of the
Bretton Woods Agreement in the early 1970s, the financial market (including
interest rates and exchange rates) was deregulated, thereby enhancing the flow of
capital between nations.'09 Until then the Bretton Woods agreement of 1945
governed the world financial system, which provided for fixed exchange rate that
expressed currency values in terms of dollars and gold.'Ho The Nixon
administration laid the foundation for a global market when it abolished the
Bretton Woods system in 1971 and replaced it with a floating exchange rate."'
This was reinforced by the resurgence of a neoliberal free-market ideology of
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation that became the "only game in town"
following the ascendance of political conservatives-Reagan in the U.S. and
Thatcher in Great Britain.' 12 The collapse of the former socialist countries and the
emergence of the neoliberal thinking as a dominant and unchallenged school of
thought further reinforced the global market foundation. All these factors created
an environment conducive for the free movement of goods, including capital
goods, and services as well as finance, thereby seemingly creating an integrated
global economy. In various articles, I have discussed the main causes of this
contradictory, but nonetheless integrating, moment in the world economy."
However, an alternative set of policies that can address the problems of slow
growth and external payments while promoting the equalization and enhancement
of social capabilities is also possible, as the discussion in Section 5 below will
show.
Before discussing these, however, I discuss the links between "social"
capabilities and process aspects of women's rights. Sen points out correctly that
while his version of capabilities approach is superior to others-e.g., the Rawlsian
primary goods framework-in terms of opportunities and positive freedom aspects,
it is weak concerning the procedural aspects of freedom and justice.114 Indeed,
108. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 6.




113. Haider A. Khan, Using Macroeconomic Computable General Equilibrium Models to Assess
the Poverty Reduction Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies, (ADBI, Tokyo: Japan, Discussion
Paper No. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Khan, Equilibrium Models], available at
http://www.adbi.org/files/2004.07.dpl 2.macroeconomic.equilibrium.models.poverty.pdf.
114. See Sen, Human Rights and Capabilities, supra note 2; Sen, Elements, supra note 2.
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Rawls's "first principle" of justice centers on the priority of liberty.' The first
part of his "second principle" involves procedural fairness. In particular, it
demands "positions and offices [be] open to all."" 6
If we take Rawls seriously, we must properly emphasize the process aspect of
liberty in any foundational theory of human rights that claims to have some degree
of comprehensiveness. Here the attraction of the "social" and political
interpretation of capabilities is that to some extent the social rules that respect this
emphasis on process can be included. A full articulation of this position is beyond
the scope of this paper. The intuition behind this claim, however, is that a
Hegelian approach that explicitly recognizes the importance of social and political
institutions in defining freedom and social individuality in incorporating the
process aspect within the ethical community (sittlichkeit).''"
VI. THE ROLE OF A NETWORK OF INSTITUTIONS IN CREATING SOCIAL
CAPABILITIES FOR WOMEN: FREEDOM AS THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL
CAPABILITIES EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS
From our normative analysis so far it would appear that a nuanced, broad
consequentialism of the sort Sen advocates-"a goal rights system with
consequence based reasoning"-is superior to a narrow deontological view of
rights and freedom such as Nozick's." 8 However, the modern Hegel-Marx
connections push us further in the direction of a critical assessment of institutions
and the need for radical institutional change if necessary. The necessity for such
changes is obvious in predatory regimes such as the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia,
or Saudi Arabia under corrupt princes. A wide range of institutional changes is
necessary even in formally democratic regimes such as India, or Bangladesh." 9
The central point about deepening democracy is that it is an evolving,
dynamic network of institutions, and not just an agenda for piecemeal reforms.
Although individual reforms are welcome and should be supported vigorously, a
movement for "deep democracy" must advocate deeper, systemic changes along
with the specific reforms that people are fighting for at any given moment.
Therefore, the role of the new social movements for gender justice is, from this
perspective, positive and encouraging; but in order to be fully effective, these
movements must have a deep democratic agenda and fight for it openly.
The network of social, political, and economic institutions necessary for
promoting such wellbeing freedoms and agency freedoms as are necessary for the
full self-determination of women can be both historically and culturally specific,
thus respecting the ontology of difference. However, in keeping with a moral
115. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (1971).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Sen, Rights and Capabilities, supra note 2, at 152-153; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 5-6 (1974).
119. See Haider A. Khan, Democracy in Bangladesh: From Crisis to Sustainability, 9 J. BANGL.
STUDS. 13, 21 (2007) [hereinafter Khan, Democracy in Bangladesh].
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realist theory of moral progress, they must involve the actual provisioning of
adequate amounts of resources and safeguards for women's rights all around
development. Along with the constitutionally liberal guarantees of physical safety
and freedom from arbitrary coercion, there must be positive guarantees of being
able to pursue a political life of citizenship that gives social and political
opportunities to all. In the age of globalization, this implies, ultimately, that
nothing short of a global charter of rights for all humans with implementing
institutions at international, national, and local levels are called for.
This may seem hopelessly utopian to many. Therefore, let me observe that
the strategic positioning of fighting for a global citizenship does not negate the
many small, local struggles for extending well-being and agency freedoms, but
rather the strategy is predicated upon active participation in whatever capacity it is
possible, across the national boundaries in these myriads of ongoing struggles.
The more farsighted people in the anti-globalization movements around the globe
are already moving in this direction. The positive policy changes from above for
promotion of the capabilities of the disadvantaged in particular-by the
International Financial Institutions, developed country governments, and
developing country governments-are always welcome developments. However,
the partial and limited nature of these policy initiatives needs to be recognized. It
is also doubtful that without mass democratic movements from below even limited
reforms from the above will be forthcoming.
The economic struggles for better wages and working conditions in both
domestic and transnational firms are of great significance in the age of
globalization. The social capabilities of women will remain greatly stunted even
under conditions of full employment if low wages and dangerous, unhealthy
working conditions are the norm. A more radical step, which is consistent with the
logic of development as freedom, is the overcoming of domination in the
workplace. Such struggles for the overcoming of domination in the workplace can
then be connected with the broader democratic movements around the world.
The important point that emerges from this perspective is that freedom is
positive, concrete, and dynamic. It is positive in the sense of alerting us to the
need for promoting social capabilities. It is concrete in two senses. One is the
concreteness in the identification of specific functionings and capabilities that the
"development as freedom" approach calls for explicitly. The second concrete
aspect-here freedom is finally, a "concrete universal" in Hegel's
terminology' 20-is the absolute necessity to embody social freedom in concrete,
interrelated, historically specific social, political, and economic institutions. It is
dynamic in the sense that such institutions, and to some extent, the idea of freedom
itself, may undergo further changes in the direction of promoting further
capabilities as the future unfolds. In the next section, I attempt a concrete
illustration of this idea by looking at the problems of women's capabilities.
120. HEGEL, supra note 29, at 152.
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VII. WOMEN'S CAPABILITIES PROMOTION AS A SPECIAL POLICY IMPERATIVE:
PRESENT TASKS AND A MOVEMENT TOWARDS THE FUTURE
Within this project of promoting global "deep democracy" through the
progressive equalization and enhancement of social capabilities defended above,
certain items such as ecological justice, sharing of wealth across borders, and
gender justice have proved to have both logical and normative salience. Here, I
develop one theme-namely, the problem of developing women's capabilities as
an important aspect of global justice-as an example to illustrate the practical
relevance of the capabilities approach.
Here, too, the two important modern pioneers are Sen and Nussbaum. Sen's
Inequality Reexamined has an important chapter on Gender and Capabilities.121
Sen has contributed to a rigorous examination of the connections between gender
and capabilities both conceptually and through empirical work in collaboration
with others. Women, Culture and Development-Nussbaum's edited volume with
Jonathan Glover as the coeditor-is another landmark contribution to the field of
gender and development.122 Nussbaum's Women and Human Development: The
Capabilities Approach is also a most illuminating contribution, but here I will
focus on her pioneering contribution, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings,
in Women Culture, and Development for the most part.123
Incidentally, Nussbaum also takes issue with certain relativist postmodern
criticisms of "essentialism" and defends an Aristotelian "essentialist" conception
of capabilities in Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings as well.124 My
approach here dispenses with "essentialism" in favor of ontological difference but
defends the human flourishing for women cogently by conceptualizing capabilities
as fully social within a history of struggles for moral progress that accord with the
theory of moral realism of Richard Boyd in particular.125
The Nussbaum-Glover book begins with a concrete case study of a woman's
right to employment in India and Bangladesh based on her fieldwork by Martha
Chen.126  Apart from the editors, the book presents a number of different
perspectives on methodology and foundations of conceptualizing women's
equality.127 For example, Onora O'Neill presents a vigorous case against using
121. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra note 21, at 117-128.
122. WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES (Martha C.
Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
123. Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, in WOMEN, CULTURE,
AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover
eds., 1995) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Female Human Beings]; NUSSBAUM, WOMEN, supra note 22.
124. Nussbaum, Female Human Beings, supra note 123, at 62-64.
125. See Richard Boyd, On the Current Status of Scientific Realism, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 195, 207-10 (Richard Boyd et al. eds., 1991).
126. Martha Chen, A Matter of Survival: Women's Right to Employment in India and Bangladesh,
in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 37 (Martha C.
Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
127. See WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES, supra note
123.
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preference satisfaction as the normative criterion in economics. 128 She couples this
with an equally vigorous defense of the capabilities approach.129 She is, however,
a Kantian and weaves skillfully the capabilities approach with a form of the
Kantian principle that we not act on principles that we cannot act upon by all and
argues that such a Kantian principle can serve as a valuable test for viable social
policies. Her arguments result in showing that victimization, "by violence, by
coercion, by intimidation . . ."130 is simply unacceptable. Inter alia, this is also a
powerful condemnation of the victimization of women.
I have already mentioned David Crocker's meticulous essay on the concept of
capabilities.' 3' Hilary Putnam also defends a pragmatic approach close to John
Dewey's position that there could be a rational basis for articulating and holding
onto an ethical position.' 32 Although, as Linda Alcoff points out in her comments,
some feminists have followed philosophers such as Nietzsche and Foucault in
order to criticize the kind of "rationalistic" approach Putnam defends, the point
that democratic processes are necessary in Putnam's argument seems to be
intact. In my defense of a deeper form of democracy, I have emphasized the
need for respecting differences, as well as the role of power and desire, without
making the last two items either epiphenomena or overwhelmingly arbitrary.
Indeed, the recognition of the Dionysian aspects of human nature leads to the need
for a structure and procedures for democracy that will both protect individuals
from tyranny and promote their social capabilities in an interactive, causally
reciprocal, and efficacious manner.
Respecting differences among cultures does not preclude a consideration of
cross-cultural standards of justice. This is an important conclusion drawn by Seyla
Benhabib in the Nussbaum-Glover volume.134 There are internal debates within
each culture about justice, as Sen and others have also pointed out.' 35 There may
be sufficient common ground among seemingly different cultures in their critical
and reflective discourses on ethics and justice. This points to the possibility of
discussing women's capabilities from a global and objective perspective. There
are a number of other essays-conceptual and empirical-including the highly
128. Onora O'Neill, Justice, Capabilities, and Vulnerabilities, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 140, 141-44 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan
Glover eds., 1995).
129. Id. at 143-45.
130. Id. at 147.
131. See Crocker, supra note 53.
132. See HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 21-26 (James Conant ed., 1990).
133. See Linda Alcoff, Democracy and Rationality: A Dialogue with Hilary Putnam, in WOMEN,
CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 226, 231-32 (Martha C. Nussbaum
& Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
134. Seyla Benhabid, Cultural Complexity, Moral Interdependence, and the Global Dialogical
Community, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 235, 249-
52 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
135. See DONNELLY, supra note 12; ISHAY, supra note 1, at 47, 60, 126-27; KHAN, TECHNOLOGY
(1998), supra note 8, at 123-33; Khan, Deep Democracy (2009), supra note 8, at 54-58; Khan, Deep
Democracy (2007), supra note 8, at 2-5, 10; Khan, Democracy in Bangladesh, supra note 119, at 15-16.
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relevant and important essays in Part IV, which give regional perspectives on
women's equality from China, Mexico, India, and Africa. From matters of basic
functionings, such as health and survival, to issues related to political voice-in
short, the whole spectrum of functionings related to self-determination-there is
by now compelling recorded evidence of discrimination against women almost
everywhere in the world. In developing countries, along with general
discrimination, there are also important regional variations. For example, even
with great poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa shows less gender discrimination in basic
health matters than the wealthy Indian state of the Punjab. This also allows us to
illustrate the severity of such discrimination in some Asian countries in particular.
The female-male ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa is 102.2 to 100.136 The same
ratio for many Asian, Latin American, and North African countries is much
lower-in fact, the female percentage is less than male percentage. 137 In order to
dramatize the issue, Sen has expressed this gap as the absolute number of "missing
women."' 38 Following this approach, in the 1990s, the number of missing women
in Southeast Asia was 2.4 million; in Latin America it was 4.4 million; in North
Africa, 2.4 million; in Iran, 1.4 million; in China 44 million; in India 36.7 million;
in West Asia, 4.3 million.139 According to Dreze and Sen, in India there are more
girls dying than boys; i.e. mortality rates are higher for the girls. 140 Additionally,
the mortality rates are higher for women than men in all age groups until the late
thirty.141 As Chen, Nussbaum, and others have pointed out, income poverty alone
cannot explain this tragic fact.142 Social and political arrangements, including what
commonly goes under the names of customs and culture, are also implicated.143
The limits of cultural relativism become apparent in such a defining case as
women's mortality. Increasingly, the women and the poor themselves are
speaking out and asking for solutions.'"
Does this imply that "enlightened" policy makers and foreign aid workers,
including the NGOs, have the moral right to impose their policies on the women in
poor communities? Far from it. What we really need are new institutions
inclusive of women, led by them locally and working cooperatively with the other
democratic institutions. In other words, promotion of "deep democracy" at the
local level with active participation and leadership from local women is a
necessary condition.
136. Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction, in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF
HUMAN CAPABILITIES 1, 3 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter
Nussbaum, Introduction].
137. See SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 104-05 (1999).
138. Id. at 104.
139. Nussbaum, Introduction, supra note 136, at 3.
140. Amartya Sen, Women's Survival as a Development Problem, 43 BULLETIN OF THE AMER.
ACAD. ARTS & SCIs., 14, 16 (1989).
141. Id. at 16.
142. See Chen, supra note 126, at 52-53; Nussbaum, Introduction, supra note 136, at 3.
143. Nussbaum, Introduction, supra note 136, at 3-4.
144. DEEPA NARAYAN ET. AL., CAN ANYONE HEAR Us? 273-83 (2000).
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It is also an implication of this type of policy and institutional approach that a
serious attempt must be made to collect and interpret the relevant information
regarding the functionings and capabilities of women. Indicators such as life
expectancy, females as a percentage of total population, and other demographic
data are, needless to say, as relevant as ever. Social indicators for education and
rights to participate in social life are also crucial. Additionally, political indicators
of democratic rights and democratic participation are of great importance. Only
when women have rights and are actually participating at all levels of political
organization, and indeed leading many of them, is it possible to claim that positive
political freedoms for women are an actuality.
VIII.CONCLUsIONS: THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL CAPABILITIES APPROACH AS AN
EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS
In the end, we must recognize both the ontological basis in differential social
history of women for a social capabilities approach to women's human rights as
freedom and its normative and practical policy implications. This is why I try to
defend the concept of social capabilities in the book Technology, Development and
Democracy in a non-foundational and presuppositionless way while drawing out
the policy lessons.145 Furthermore, as the pioneering work of Sen and Nussbaum,
among others, have shown elegantly, there are many philosophical defenses of the
basic capabilities approach. The ontology of difference can do this by focusing on
women both as human beings and as a particular type of human beings with full
claims to individuality in the John Duns Scotus' sense of haecceity.146
The more important real world issue now is to make the many policy
implications of this approach subject of debate and discussion. This is already
happening to some extent. We have mentioned the human development index and
its various refinements.147  There are also periodic conferences at various
universities around the world to discuss theoretical advances and applications of
the capabilities approach. The World Institute for Development Economics
Research ("WIDER") has an ongoing research agenda that corresponds quite
closely to the social capabilities approach.14 8 One hope that emerges out of all
these activities is that policy makers in the International Financial Institutions and
the various regional and national organizations will attempt seriously to implement
a social capabilities-based approach. Two most important areas are poverty
reduction and overcoming women's particular deprivations. Needless to say, these
are related areas where policy approach must engage in active dialogues with
women and formulate policies with their full democratic participation.
145. KHAN, TECHNOLOGY (1998), supra note 8, at 95-99.
146. JOHN DUNS SCOTus, EARLY OXFORD LECTURE OF INDIVIDUATION 82, 1 170 (2005).
147. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2001 MENTAL HEALTH: NEW
UNDERSTANDING, NEW HOPE (2001), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/200I/en/whr0 Ien.pdfua=1.
148. See Research Programme, UNITED NATIONS UNIV.-WORLD INST. FOR DEV. ECON.
RESEARCH, http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
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These do not cover all of the applicable areas, but are paradigmatic in the
sense that the clear and present relevance of the approach logically leads to an
agenda for action ranging from income transfers, public and private employment
creation to political freedom and activism.
One broad area of practical application, as even the International Financial
Institutions move away from the so-called Washington Consensus is the design
and implementation of alternative structural adjustment policies ("ASAPs").
Basically, the conventional structural adjustments policies ("SAPs") focus on short
to medium run results regarding inflation and balance-of- payments equilibrium.' 49
In the case of many impoverished economies, privatization itself may have become
a goal for structural reform. Likewise, market-making can also become a goal in
itself.15 0 Not enough recognition has been accorded to the economic side effects
such as unemployment or (at least a temporary) lowering of output. Social
dimensions of adjustment came to be recognized even later. The status of
vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the poor do not often figure
explicitly in these programs. From the arguments presented in this paper, it seems
that in order to design a capability-enhancing ASAP the following elements must
figure prominently:
1. A clear recognition of the status of the different socio-economic groups in
developing countries in terms of their economic and overall level of well-
being.
2. A list of priorities in terms of economic and social goals must be
prepared. In the case of incompatibilities of some of these goals, the
question of trade-offs must be raised and resolved explicitly rather than
implicitly through the logic of the market.
3. In particular, issues of fair inter-regional allocation of resources or
opportunities must be addressed explicitly.
4. Human development indicators based on the capability framework must
become an integral part of ASAPs.
5. As our discussion in the previous section shows, the record of developing
countries concerning gender disparities is not flattering. Therefore,
gender-justice must become a central part of ASAPs-not a peripheral
issue to be ignored or to be resolved later after enough growth has taken
place.
6. As alluded to in the brief discussion of ecology, environment, and
sustainable development, with ecological effects of adjustment included,
must become the conceptual center of thinking about ASAPs in these
economies.
149. In Khan & Sogabe, supra note 71, we have attempted a statistical evaluation of the impacts of
the IMF programs for a large number of LDCs.
150. Market-making here refers to the idea that creation of markets for anything, i.e. commodifying
everything, is the solution. This has led to the privatization of water and protests against it among other
privatization and market-making moves.
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7. It follows then that an ASAP must explicitly address ecological and
distributional issues related to women in particular. This implies that
there will be a need for careful inter-disciplinary studies on probable
impacts of a policy package before its implementation. It also implies the
need for follow-up studies in order to assess the after-effects of an ASAP.
The crucial aspect here from the perspective of development as freedom is
to ascertain which substantive freedoms are enhanced or diminished and
then to assess their overall significance.
Looking further beyond the current economic problems with SAP, we might
ask if the freedom-centered perspective of women's rights and development will
survive. For not only is the world divided between the rich and the poor, there are
also dark and destructive political and cultural forces ranging from arms race to
global terrorism. Indeed, it will be naive to pretend that recognition of what is
good will automatically lead to that good. Here again, the argument cannot stop at
simply establishing the validity of the women's rights as demands for enhancing
the social capabilities as freedom approach, but it must furnish grounds for
thinking that there is a fighting chance of getting there.
The emphasis here on both achieving constitutional guarantees of freedom
and on the need for an ever vigilant politically aware and active mass democratic
movement will, I hope, focus attention on the crucial political and cultural aspects
of equalizing capabilities for women. Without a vigorous, self-aware, and self-
critical democratic movement that genuinely respects social individuality and its
all around development, the approach discussed here can only be just another
academic discourse. The substantive approach to social capabilities underlined in
this paper gives me hope that combining a critical theory with all around social
practice and movement from below will make women's rights as human rights an
achievable project in our lifetime.
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